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Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the Class Action?
. ; Yes: Permitting courts to
strike bar on class actions
in otherwise clean clause
would discourage use of
4 arbitration
By Carroll E. Neesemann
At first glance it might appear that four recent cases in
California federal and state courts evidence -i trend toward
increased power for consumers and employees to
challenge pre-dispute arbitration agreements. But not so
fiast. The state of the law elsewhere seems quite different.
Presumably, even in Califlornia, the last word has not been
written on the issue. In any case, steps can be taken to
improve the likelihood of enforcement of' arbitration
agreement;. And there are road maps to guide companies
in writing arbitration agreements that are fair and more
likely to stand up, even when they preclude class actions.
Grounds for invalidity
Arbitration agreements with consumers and employees
have long been upheld, despite being contained in
contracts of adhesion. Under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate is to be
enforced like any other contract and not burdened with
special limitations.' Generally, contracts of adhesion
between parties of unequal bargaining power are
enforceable unless they exhibit some additional infirmity.
The U.S. Supreme Court has approved numerous
arbitration agreements that apparently had been imposed
on plaintiffs who had little or no bargaining power. Six
involved claims ofcustomers oremployees in the securities
industry.' Two were franchise cases.' One involved an
auto distributorship against a manufacturer.' Another
concerned a homeowner.' Two recent cases addressed the
claims of a borrower' and an employee,7 respectively.
Unconscionability
One ground that can invalidate an arbitration agreement
is unconscionability. In the words of the Supreme Court,
"[Glenerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
Conlinued on Page 14.
Carroll Neesemann is a partner in Morrison & Foerster
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poses some of the issues and collects some of the cases
discussed in this article.
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By Jean R. Sternlight
Companies are deliberately using mandatory arbitration
to prevent consumers and employces from joining together in
class actions. As Carroll Neesemann has explained,
eliminating the class action is a "strong incentive" of those
companies that impose the requirement of arbitration on
consumers and employees. Mr. Neesemann defends this
phenomenon, and his article offers companies and their
attorneys some tips on how to effectively use arbitration to
insulate themselves from the threat of class actions. By
contrast, this essay argues that it is dangerous and unwise to
permit companies to use mandatory arbitration to exempt
themselves from class action suits.
The phenomenon of eliminating class actions
Companies have recently begun to use arbitration
clauses explicitly to proscribe consumers or employees from
joining together in class actions. A clause imposed by credit
card provider MBNA states in relevant part, "[NIo claim may
be brought as a class action or as a private attorney general.
You will not have the right to act as a class representative or
participate as a member of a class of claimants with respect to
any claim." Numerous other companies have adopted similar
language, which is geared to prevent customers or employees
from joining together in class actions either in arbitration or in
litigation. Drafters of these clauses know that if they can
eliminate class actions, they can often eliminate claims
exposure altogether because individual claims will not be
brought.'
The limitation on class actions within arbitration as well
as litigation is significant. Although many have assumed that
a class action arbitration is a sort of procedural oxymoron,
arbitral class actions are well established in California' and.
have been brought in several other jurisdictions as well.'
California attorneys who have participated in arbitral class
actions describe the process as quite similar to the litigated
class action. These attorneys explain that the court decides
"class" issues such as the definition of the class and the terms
of the class notice, and that the fact finding is then turned over
to the arbitrators.'
Continued on Page 19.
Jean Stemlight is John D. Lawson Professor of Law at the
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Is the class action a good thing?
Although Carroll Neesemann and
potential defendants may not like class
actions," the U.S. Congress and Supreme
Court have clearly endorsed the
procedural device. Tracing its roots to
the Middle Ages, the modem class
action was made part of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1966. In 1980, the
Supreme Court set out some of the many
advantages of the class action procedure:
The resolution of indiv
arbitration is no adequ
resolution of group cla
I[t] may motivate [plaintiffs] to
bring cases that for economic
reasons might not be brought
otherwise, [thereby] vindicating
the rights of individuals who
otherwise might not consider it
worth the candle to embark on
litigation in which the optimum
result might be more than
consumed by the cost .... [T]he
financial incentive that class
actions offer . . . is a natural
outgrowth of the increasing
reliance on the 'private attorney
general' for the vindication of
legal rights .... Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain
relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of
small individual suits for damages,
aggrieved persons may be without
any effective redress unless they
may employ the class-action
device.7
More recently, in Orliz v. Fibreboard
Corporation, the Supreme Court again
explained that the class action is highly
advantageous because of the
"opportunity to save the enormous
transaction costs of piecemeal litigation.
Because the class action allows
claims to be brought that could not
otherwise be filed, it is reviled by
potential defendants and beloved by
potential plaintiffs and those who seek
to ensure that our laws are properly
enforced. Whether compared to
individual litigation or to individual
arbitration, class actions help deal with
problems of lack of information and lack
of financing for small claims.
Specifically, consumers often lack
the knowledge that their contract may be
illegal, and employees may well not
realize that they are being discriminated
against or otherwise treated illegally.
But when such potential claimants are
included in a class, they are afforded
idual claims through
ate substitute for the
ims in a class action.
notice of the claim and typically given an
opportunity to choose whether to
participate in the class action.
Further, even when consumers or
employees begin to suspect that they are
being treated illegally, it often makes no
sense forthem to bring claims individually.
Only an irrational and/or independently
wealthy consumer would take the time
and spend the money to fight claims
regarding issues such as excessive check
bouncing charges or improper phone
billing policies. Many employees are in a
similar position when they don't cam a
great deal of money to start with, can't
prove large dollar losses, and don't want
to run the risk of being fired. When
claims are small, the individual plaintiffs
will not be able to afford to hire attorneys,
nor will rational attorneys take such
claims on a contingent fee basis. Thus,
as a California appellate court explained,
the class action prohibition is used to
obtain "virtual immunity" for the company
from small claims."
Arbitration itself offers no adequate
solution to these problems. Arbitration is
not always quicker and cheaper than
litigation. In the employment context,
many plaintiffs in arbitration have found
that they must pay thousands and
thousands of dollars in filing fees and
arbitrator hourly fees simply to get the
services of a neutral that they could
procure in court for a mere filing fee."
Further, even ifarbitration were shown to
be quicker and cheaper, it has never been
demonstrated that consumers or
employees who pursue individual claims
in arbitration, without the assistance of
an attorney, have a decent likelihood of
prevailing on theirclaims."
Moreover, the district court in Ting
%v. AT&r7 2 points to an even more
fundamental problem: many of the group
claims that are typically brought in class
actions are not even subject to resolution
on an individual basis. After having
examined the types of claims that had
actually been brought against AT&T in
the previous year, the district court
reached the following conclusion:
It appears that the principal types
of claims which members of the
class can expect to litigate outside
small claims court are not
individual billing disputes or
disputes about poor service, but
claims of intentional misconduct,
such as discrimination or
harassment in the course of
providing service, credit reporting
problems and problems relating
to identity theft and claims that
involve practices or problems
that pertain to all or a group of
consumers. Examples of group
claims include complaints about
the way AT&T is measuring the
length of a call or complaints that
AT&T has misrepresented the
terms of a calling plan in its
advertising. If a consumer
complains about such a practice,
AT&T can try to satisfy the
consumer by making a billing
adjustment, but it cannot change
its practice as to only that
consumer without being
considered discriminatory under
the FCC's standards."'
In other words, the resolution of
individual claims through arbitration is
no adequate substitute for the resolution
of group claims in a class action. As the
Ting court concluded, "It would not
have been economically feasible to
pursue the claims in these cases on an
individual basis, whether the case was
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brought in court or in arbitration."' 4
While Mr. Neesemann contends that
,uch claims "appear to be ... within the
jurisdiction of regulatory entities set up
to police such practices," his position
fails to recognize that our legal system
is dependent ol suits brought by
individual victims and not merely by
poorly funded regulatory agencies. As
the Ting court explained, "ITIhe FCC
does not appear to have concerned
itselfwith obtaining individual relieffor
the complainants, even in situations
where the FCC has concluded the
carrier committed an 'egregious'
practice.""'
Some might suggest that if an
individual consumer or employee lacks
the knowledge or financial wherewithal
to bring a claim individually, then the
claim must not be worth bringing.
However, in approving the use of class
actions both Congress and the Supreme
Court have recognized that a group
claim may be important to support
enforcement of the law, even where an
individual claim might not be viable. It
is unjust for a company to illegally lake
small amounts ofmoney from millions of
consumers or employees simply
because no individual consumer or
employee can bring a legal challenge to
that action. 7
Some might also suggest that
because class actions are sometimes
abused by plaintiffs or their attorneys,
companies are justified in using
arbitration clauses to protect themselves.
However, while there is no doubt that
sonic class action settlements have
brought more benefit to the plaintiffs'
attorneys than to the class members,
these problems cry out for legislative
reform rather than companies' self-help.
Proposed reforms to the class action are
currently under review at various levels
including Congress. Revisions to the
class action process should be
implemented by legislative bodies and
rules drafters, after having considered
all sides' perspectives, rather than by
companies seeking to maximize their
own self interest. If we have learned
nothing else from the Enron debacle, at
least it has illustrated that leaving
companies to regulate themselves does
not always serve the public interest.
Challenges under existing law
Under existing law at least two types
of legal challenges can be brought to
prevent companies from using arbitration
clauses to insulate themselves from class
actions.'" Sometimes eliminating the
opportunity to proceed by class action
can be attacked as unconscionable, and
sometimes eliminating the opportunity to
proceed by class action can be shown to
violate the terms ol a particular federal
statute. Both challenges require that
plaintiffs make a strong factual showing.
The unconscionability argument
To establish that an arbitration
clause is unconscionable, plaintiffs must
usually attack it onl both procedural and
substantive grounds. Courts will not
void clauses based on generalized
attacks,' so plaintiffs must be sure to
build strong factual records using
documents, affidavits and depositions."
The procedural element is usually fairly
easy to establish where the arbitration
clause has been imposed on a mandatory
basis. Substantively, while the precise
wording varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, a contract is usually deemed
to be unconscionable when it is
substantially one-sided or unreasonable.
When a class action prohibition
operates entirely to deprive plaintiffs of a
viable forum for their claim, either in
arbitration or in litigation, plaintiffs
should be able to show that the
prohibition is substantively
unconscionable. The federal court in
Ting made just such a finding:
[T]he prohibition on class actions
will prevent class members from
effectively vindicating their rights
in certain categories of claims,
especially those involving
practices applicable to all
members of the class but as to
which any consumer has so little
at stake that she cannot be
expected to pursue her claim ...
The ban is effectively one-sided
since it is hard to conceive of a
class action suit that AT&T
would file against its customers.
And the only justification
advanced for it, that it will limit
AT&T's costs of litigation, is
insufficient to overcome numerous
determinations by legislators and
courts, . . that class action
treatment offers the public a
vehicle for vindicating legal rights
when individual claims are not
economically feasible. For all
these reasons, the ban on class
actions is substantively
unconscionable.'
A: least four other courts have
similarly concluded that a prohibition on
class actions helped to render a
mandatory arbitration provision, or the
class action prohibition itself,
substantively unconscionable.22 While
Mr. Neesemann is correct that in some
cases other factors also contributed to
these courts' findings of
unconscionability, the courts' decisions
provide no support for the position that a
"mere" class action prohibition should
be permissible so long as the arbitration
clause does not contain other unfair
features. Rather, when the class action
prohibition operates entirely to deprive
claimants of a viable forum in either
litigation or arbitration for their claims,
that prohibition alone ought to be
sufficient to render the clause
unconscionable.'
Admittedly, the unconscionability
argument cannot and should not be used
to void all class action prohibitions. By
its nature, the argument is fict-dependent.
Thus, in those cases where plaintiffs'
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When a clause prohibiting class action operates to
entirely deprive claimants of a viable forum in either
litigation or arbitration for their claims, that prohibition
alone ought to be sufficient to render the clause
unconscionable.
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individual claims are such that
individualized arbitration is an adequate
forum, the class action prohibition may
not be unconscionable. But where, as
the court found in Ting, the company is
using the class action prohibition
contained in the arbitration clause "to
shield itself f'ron liability"2'4 by making it
"very di fficult for anyonc to vindicate her
rights"25 in any forum, then courts
should find such prohibitions
unconscionable.
The statutory argument
It is now well established that
mandatory arbitration clauses must fall
when they are tund to prevent plaintiffs
from vindicating federal statutory rights.
Thus, the Supreme Court and numerous
federal circuits have explained that
arbitration clauses are invalid when they
impose excessive costs or deny plaintiffs
remedies to which they are entitled under
1'deral law.""
rights in any forum.
Depending upon the language and
legislative history of the particular
federal statute under which they are
suing, plaintiffs may similarly be able to
argue that the arbitration clause is invalid
because it prevents them from proceeding
in a class action, as provided for by
statute. In the consumer context,
plaintiffs have attempted to make this
argument under the Truth in Lending
Act, but the claim has failed more often
than it has succeeded.27 With respect to
employment claims, courts are mixed as
to whether the Fair Labor Standards
Act's Section 216(b) guarantees plaintiffs
a right to proceed collectively. 9 Whether
or not courts ultimately accept plaintiffs'
arguments that either or both of those
statutes preserve plaintiffs' right to
proceed collectively, plaintiffs may
convince courts that other statutes
provide that right, or Congress may be
convinced to pass legislation that
protects that right in new or existing
statutes.
A need for legislative action?
It is clear that companies are already
heeding the advice ofCarroll Neesemann
and others by attempting to use arbitration
clauses as a shield to protect themselves
from both arbitral and litigated class
actions. What is not yet clear is whether
courts will put their imprimatur on
companies' efforts to eliminate class
actions. If courts follow Ting and prove
willing to use unconscionability and
statutory doctrines to limit companies'
efforts at sell-protection, then no
legislation may be needed. But, if most
courts fail to follow this lead and instead
allow companies to use arbitration
clauses to insulate themselves from
liability, then legislative action will be
required.
The "due process" protections
urged by Mr. Neesemann are meaningless
in situations in which companies are
using class action prohibitions to prohibit
consumers or employees from pursuing
claims in any forum. What is the value of
a "fair" process or an impartial arbitrator
when the reality is that the class action
prohibition will eliminate all claims?
Arbitration clauses are inherently
unfair when they contain class action
prohibitions that eliminate plaintiffs'
opportunity to vindicate their rights in
any forum. If the courts prove unable to
resist companies' efforts to eliminate
class actions, Congress will have to step
in to restore this important procedural
device and the role it has played in
assuring justice in the United States.
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